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CITIZENSHIP FOR EIGHTEEN YEAR OLDs-AGE OF MAJORITY IN WASH-
INGTON-Ch. 292, Washington Laws of 1971.
The 1971 Washington Legislature helped bridge the generation gap
by lowering the age of majority to eighteen years for almost all pur-
poses.' The statute manifests a confidence in the maturity of persons
between eighteeen and twenty-one years of age and recognizes their
readiness to accept the responsibilities of citizenship.2 Although Con-
gress brought this issue to the center of national awareness with the
passage of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970,3 the task of
extending to eighteeen year olds the full measure of legal rights re-
mains with the states. The purpose of this note is to summarize by
1. "Except as otherwise specifically provided by law, all persons shall be deemed
and taken to be of full age for all purposes at the age of eighteen years." Ch. 292, § 1
[1971] Wash. Laws, 1st Ex. Sess., amending WASH. REV. CODE § 26.28.010 (1970).
Unamended statutes specifically providing that twenty-one is the legal age are discussed
in note 115 and accompanying text, infra.
The 1971 act took effect on August 9, 1971, and is a consummation of the legislative
efforts initiated in Ch. 17 [1970] Wash. Laws, 2d Ex. Sess. The 1970 legislature reduced
the age of majority to eighteen years for the specific purposes of 1) marriage without
parental consent, 2) executing wills, 3) voting if authorized by the Constitution, 4) en-
tering contracts, 5) making decisions with respect to the body and 6) suing and being
sued in a nonrepresentative capacity. For all other purposes the 1970 law retained
twenty-one years as the legal age. Section one of the 1971 act shifts the emphasis by
making eighteen years full legal age for all purposes except where otherwise specifically
provided, and in section two it reenacts the six specific provisions outlined above. How-
ever, in cases where the effective date of these six provisions is of legal relevance, it
should be noted that all but the voting section became operative on May 14, 1970, the
effective date of the 1970 law.
Sections 3 through 76 of the 1971 act change the specific references in the Code to
eighteen in place of twenty-one, and section 77 provides for severability in the event
that any section is held invalid.
2. The age of majority was early established as twenty-one at common law in Eng-
land, but its purpose bears little relation to present day age classifications. In the
opinion of many historians, the choice of twenty-one as the age of maturity was an out-
growth of medieval requirements of time sufficient for military training and develop-
ment of a physique adequate to bear heavy armor. See James, The Age of Majority, 4
AM. J. LEGAL HisT. 22, 30 (1960).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 note, 1973b, 1973c, 1973aa-1973bb-4 (1970). The legislative
history of the Amendments contains a wealth of empirical data documenting the educa-
tion, experience and maturity of the eighteen year old of today. See Note, Legislative
History of Title III of the Voting Rights Act of 1970, 8 HARV. J. LEGIS. 123 (1970). In
the Amendments, Congress in part lowered the voting age to eighteen for both federal
and state elections. The statute was held unconstitutional as to state elections. See notes
49 and 50, infra. This prompted ratification of amendment 26 to the United States con-
stitution extending to eighteen year olds the right to vote in both federal and state elec-
tions. See note 48 and accompanying text, infra.
367
Washington Law Review
topic the changes brought about by the 1971 Washington statute and
to identify some of the legal questions created by the enactment itself.4
1. DOMESTIC RELATIONS
The law of domestic relations was significantly affected by the
1971 act. Persons eighteen years of age may enter into any marriage
contract without parental consent5 if otherwise qualified by law.6 Ex-
isting Washington law still provides that persons seventeen years of
age may marry with parental consent, but if either party is under that
age the marriage is void unless the age requirement is waived by a
superior court judge on a showing of necessity. 7 An anomaly in the
Washington law may be found in the provision that all females mar-
ried to a person of full age shall be deemed to be of full age;8 there is
no comparable provision for males. By virtue of their newly acquired
rights to litigate without a guardian ad litem,9 eighteen year old per-
sons may now sue and be sued for divorce. The 1971 act also
amended the adoption statute to provide that if an eighteeen year old
person consents in writing to his own adoption, no investigation or
notice of any hearing is required. 10
4. Because the age of majority is not uniform among the various states, conflict of
laws problems will arise and must be given careful scrutiny by lawyers advising young
people and others who deal with them. For an introduction to the law in this area con-
sult Ehrenzweig, Contractual Capacity of Married Women and Infants in the Conflict of
Laws, 43 MN I N. L. REv. 899 (1959); James, The Effects ofthe Autonomy ofthe Parties on
Conflict-of-Laws Contracts involving Capacity, 23 U. PITT. L. REV. 705 (1962); Schoen-
bach, Capacity of Minors and the Conflict of Laws, 17 B.U.L. REV. 623 (1937). Some
family law conflicts problems are discussed in two articles by Professor Leflar: Conflict
of Laws, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 62 (1960); Conflict of Laws, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 36 (1961).
5. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.28.015 (1971).
6. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.04.030 (1959), and 26.04.210 (1970).
7. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.04.010 (1970). As a practical matter "necessity" has
meant pregnancy. However, the word could be construed by a friendly judge to include
a situation where youngsters are madly in love.
8. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.28.020 (1959). In practice, this statute has not been as-
serted as a basis for allowing such females to consume liquor, vote, operate motor vehi-
cles, or perform other acts which by statute have specific age requirements. It has served
as an emancipation statute to remove married females from parental authority. By lim-
iting its coverage to females, it could be argued that this statute lacks the constitutional
ingredient of equal protection. If it were challenged on this ground, a judge might be
more inclined to hold the statute invalid than to legislate by extending its coverage to
males similarly situated.
9. WAsH. REV. CODE § 26.28.015 (1971). See notes 59-63 and accompanying text,
infra.
10. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.32.110 (1971). For a discussion of various questions re-
lated to the adoption of adults see Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 1012 (1968).
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One very significant effect of the 1971 act is to terminate parents'
legal duty to furnish support when their children reach eighteen years
of age. The greatest impact is in the divorce area. The 1971 statute
expressly reduces the age of majority to eighteen years, unless other-
wise specifically provided by law. It has long been the rule in Wash-
ington that a parent's liability under a divorce decree for the support
of a minor child ceases when the child reaches its majority."
Recently, in Mallen v. Mallen,12 the Washington Court of Appeals
held that the courts of this state lack the statutory authority in divorce
proceedings to decree the support of children over the age of majority.
The trial court refused to modify the support provisions of a divorce
decree to provide payments for the medical care of the parties' daugh-
ter, who was suffering from an allegedly chronic brain tumor. The
court affirmed, reasoning that R.C.W. 26.08.110, which authorizes
the court to make disposition of the property of the parties in divorce
actions, contains no provision authorizing an adjudication other than
of "custody, support and education of the minor children of such mar-
riage."'1 3 The court recognized that a duty of support may exist under
such circumstances, but it would have to be pursued outside the di-
vorce statute.' 4 Shortly after deciding Mallen, the Washington
Court of Appeals in Smith v. Smith15 held that even though property
settlement provisions in a divorce decree extended the father's child
support liability beyond the age of majority, these provisions could be
enforced according to their terms as contracts by normal contract
remedies, though they could not be enforced by contempt proceedings
11. Sutherland v. Sutherland, 77 Wn.2d 6, 459 P.2d 397 (1969); Herzog v. Herzog,
23 Wn.2d 382, 161 P.2d 142 (1945). Although support liability ceases when the children
reach age eighteen, this should not preclude a third party, under proper circumstances,
from recovering from parents for family expenses incurred by children over eighteen
years of age. See WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.205 (1969). Moreover, Washington parents
may have a court-created duty to support their adult children who are incapable of sup-
porting themselves. See Van Tinker v. Van Tinker, 38 Wn.2d 390, 229 P.2d 333 (1951)
(dictum).
12. 4 Wn. App. 185, 480 P.2d 219 (1971).
13. Id. at 187, 480 P.2d at 221. This result is consistent with Dawson v. Dawson, 71
Wn.2d 66, 426 P.2d 614 (1967). In Dawson, the Washington Supreme Court held that
the divorce court's jurisdiction to punish as contempt of court the nonpayment of ac-
crued support obligations terminates when the youngest child attains majority. The
court recognized that the contempt power is to insure the support of minor children
under orders entered pursuant to WASH. REV. CODE § 26.08.110 (1959) and not to pro-
tect the person having custody.
14. 4 Wn. App. at 187, 480 P.2d at 221.
15. 4 Wn. App. 608,484 P.2d 409 (1971).
369
Washington Law Review Vol. 47: 367, 1972
once the child reached majority. 16 The soundness of Smith is ques-
tionable for at least two reasons. First, the Washington authority cited
for the proposition that support provisions in a divorce decree may be
extended beyond the age of majority by private contract did not war-
rant that conclusion. 17 Second, the court ignored the "merger" issue.
The Washington cases are not clear as to whether child support provi-
sions in a property settlement agreement which is later incorporated in
a divorce decree thereby merge into the decree and lose their char-
acter as contract rights.' 8 There is support for merger reasoning in the
Washington cases which hold that where a property settlement agree-
ment is incorporated into a divorce decree, the rights of the parties
rest on the judgment and not on the contract. 19 If applied to Smith,
this rule would compel the result that the property settlement merged
into the decree and has no separate existence.20
On the other hand, it could be argued that where the divorce decree
cannot be enforced the contract remedies exist independently. 21 An-
16. Id. at 610, 484 P.2d at 411.
17. The court cited Knittle v. Knittle, 2 Wn. App. 208, 467 P.2d 200 (1970). Knittle
involved the enforcement of child support obligations which accrued before the child
reached majority. Thus, no issue arose as to the validity of contractual support provi-
sions which extended the support obligation beyond the children's majority. The court
also cited Sheldon v. Superior Court, 257 Cal. App. 2d 541, 65 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1967). The
Sheldon court held that support obligations could not be enforced by the contempt
power after the child reached majority. A narrow reading of Sheldon reveals that the
court's statement that post-majority support provisions may be enforced by contract
remedies was dictum. Furthermore, even if property settlement provisions in divorce
decrees are independently enforceable as contracts in California, the Washington law in
this regard is not clear. See notes 18-22 and accompanying text, infra.
18. For a general discussion of the merger problem see H. CLARk, LAW OF Do-
MESTIC RELATIONS §§ 16.12-. 14, at 554-64 (1968). If merger applies in Washington, the
divorce decree would presumably control the rights of the parties and the support obli-
gation could not be enforced beyond eighteeen under Mallen v. Mallen, 4 Wn. App.
185, 480 P.2d 219 (197 1). However, it could be modified pursuant to WASH. REV. CODE
§ 26.28.110 (1959). If Washington does not recognize merger in this situation, Smith
would suggest that the support obligation may be fully enforceable as an ordinary con-
tract. Merger is a significant issue in another context. If an obligated parent flees to a
foreign country where "full faith and credit" is not given to state support decrees, en-
forcement would be difficult if the merger rule applied. However, a suit on a normal
contract would have a greater chance of being enforced.
19. See United Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Price, 46 Wn.2d 587. 283 P.2d 119 (1955).
and cases cited therein.
20. See Berry v. Berry, 50 Wn.2d 158, 310 P.2d 223 (1957) (where a divorce decree
incorporates a property settlement agreement, the agreement merges into the decree
and the inquiry, technically at least, is as to what the court meant and not what the par-
ties meant).
2 1. See Mickens v. Nlickens, 62 Wn.2d 876, 385 P.2d 14 (1963). The Mickens court
endorsed the merger rule but held that where a party to the divorce action intentionally
fails to carry out the property settlement terms of the decree, resulting in a loss by the
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other possible argument is that a judgment on a contract is a contract
itself.22 Although most judgments lack the consensual elements of a
contract, both parties in Smith agreed to the terms of the property set-
tlement extending support obligations beyond the age of majority
which lends support to the argument that these rights were contrac-
tual. The value of Smith as a precedent will remain questionable,
however, until the Washington Supreme Court decides whether or not
the merger doctrine applies to divorce decrees extending the support
obligation beyond the age of majority.
Retroactivity of the 1971 act is another unanswered question in the
child support area. In divorce decrees entered subsequent to the effec-
tive date of the 1971 statute, support obligations will terminate when
the children reach age eighteen under the Mallen rule. However, the
question arises as to whether divorce decrees entered prior to the
effective date of the 1971 statute, which extend support obligations to
age twenty-one, will remain binding on the parties, or whether the
statute will operate retroactively to reduce the support obligation to
age eighteen.
The leading case on this issue is Springstun v. Springstun.23 A 1920
divorce decree obligated Mr. Springstun to support his daughter
"during her minority." At that time, by statute, females reached ma-
jority at eighteen years of age, while men were not of legal age until
twenty-one. In 1923 the statute was amended making twenty-one
years the age of majority for both men and women. Springstun's
daughter reached age eighteen after the effective date of the new stat-
ute, at which time he refused to make further support payments. The
trial court ordered the father to make support payments until his
daughter reached age twenty-one. The Washington Supreme Court
reversed, observing that the divorce decree, which provided for
other party, a basis for relief exists separate from the enforcement of the decree. How-
ever, the exception to the merger rule in Mickens was made because the husband delib-
erately frustrated a term of the decree. Perhaps there is more reason to follow merger
reasoning in Smith because the divorce decree is only unenforceable since the Mallen
court held that the divorce courts lack the statutory authority to extend the support obli-
gations past the age of majority.
22. Cf. Bettman v. Cowley, 19 Wash. 207, 53 P. 53 (1898). The Bettman court held
that a statute reducing the period for enforcing judgments was invalid as applied to an
existing contract judgment because both the federal and state constitutions forbid the
legislature to impair the obligation of contracts. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10; WASH.
CONsT. art. I, § 23.
23. 131 Wash. 109, 229 P. 14 (1924).
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monthly payments during the daughter's "minority," could bear no
other meaning than eighteen years at the time of its entry. The court
held that such a judgment awarding child support affected the sub-
stantive rights of the parties and thus could not be altered by a subse-
quent act of the legislature changing the age of majority.2 4 The judg-
ment was held to be property which was protected by the fundamental
law against invasion by the legislature as is any other species of prop-
erty.25
In contrast to Springstun, a retroactive application of the 1971 act
would reduce the burden on the party making support payments by
reducing the total support to be paid under the divorce decree. Such a
retroactive construction would presumably invade the property rights
of the minor children, who were protected by the prior judgment until
age twenty-one, subject only to modification.2 6 For this reason it is
likely that the 1971 act will not operate retroactively to disturb di-
vorce decrees entered prior to its effective date.
II. PROBATE
Eighteen year old persons may execute wills for the disposition of
real and personal property,2 7 if otherwise qualified by law.2 8 Also, for
24. Id. at 114, 229 P. at 16.
25. Id. Support provisions in a divorce decree were further characterized as vested
rights protected against state or federal statutes in Keen v. Goodwin, 28 Wn.2d 332. 182
P.2d 697 (1947). See also the discussion of retroactivity of the 1971 act in notes 44-47
and accompanying text, infra.
26. Although it could be argued that support obligations are not "vested rights" be-
cause they are subject to modification, this analysis is not satisfactory. The prior divorce
decrees are judgments which provide support until the children reach age twenty-one,
subject only to modification by the divorce court, and not the legislature. See Keen v.
Goodwin, 28 Wn.2d 332, 182 P.2d 697 (1947). See also Wilcox v. Wilcox, 406 S.W.2d
152 (Ky. 1966). The Wilcox court concluded for different reasons that support obliga-
tions in prior divorce decrees are not affected, holding that where a divorce decree ex-
tended the father's child support obligation until the child reached "majority," the father
was not relieved of his obligation to support the child until age twenty-one by a subse-
quent Kentucky statute lowering the age of majority from twenty-one to eighteen. The
court used contract analysis, observing that when the parties entered the property settle-
ment contract the age of majority was twenty-one and not eighteen, and that in
construing a contract the intention of the parties at the time they entered it controls.
If the Washington Supreme Court decides the 1971 act does not operate to disturb
support obligations in prior divorce decrees, the amounts accruing from ages eighteen
to twenty-one under these decrees may only be enforceable by normal execution proce-
dures and not by the contempt power in light of Dawson v. Dawson, 71 Wn.2d 66, 426
P.2d 614 (1967). See note 13, supra.
27. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.28.015 (1971).
28. See WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.010 (1970). This statute provides that any person
372
Rights of Eighteen Year Olds
purposes of the guardianship chapters, the law now provides that per-
sons eighteen years and older are of full age.29 Persons eighteen years
of age qualify as guardians of the person or estate of any incompetent
if they are otherwise suitable,30 and any parent under eighteen years
of age may so qualify if not disqualified for other reasons.31 More-
over, existing guardianships will terminate when the ward reaches age
eighteen, if he is otherwise competent.32
The law regarding the settlement of estates provides that if there be
any incompetent interested in a decedent's estate, the court may
appoint a disinterested guardian ad litem for him in its discretion at
any stage in the proceeding, and the court must appoint such a
guardian ad litem to represent the incompetent for hearings in connec-
tion with homestead awards, awards in lieu of homestead, and hear-
ings on the personal representative's final account.33 The 1971
amendments make persons under eighteen incompetent for this pur-
pose, whereas previously it had been persons under age twenty-one. 34
In addition, where a surviving spouse is the sole beneficiary under a
will, the court may now waive the appointment of a guardian ad litem
for a minor child of such spouse and the decedent, who is incompetent
solely because he is under eighteen. 35 The same chapter was also
amended to permit distribution of a decedent's estate directly to a
person over eighteen years of age,36 and to allow distributions to per-
of sound mind eighteen years of age or older may devise his property by will, and it val-
idates all wills so executed by eighteen year olds subsequent to September 16, 1940.
29. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.92.010 (1971). The guardianship amendments are found
in Ch. 28, [1971] Wash. Sess. Laws. They modify WASH. REV. CODE chs. 11.88 and
11.92 (general guardianship provisions); and 11.76 (settlement of estates). These amend-
ments all took effect on June 10, 1971.
30. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.88.020 (1971).
31. Id.
32. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.88.140 (1965) provides that a guardianship terminates
without court order and the powers of the guardian cease when the ward reaches legal
age, if he is otherwise competent.
33. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.76.080 (1971).
34. Id. For the definition of "incompetent" this section refers one to WASH. REV. CODE
§ 11.88.010 (1965), which includes as incompetents those persons who are incapable of
managing their property or caring for themselves, and those who are under the age of
majority as defined in WASH. REV. CODE § 11.92.010 (1971). The latter section now
provides that persons eighteen years old are of legal age. See note 29 and accompanying
text, supra.
35. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.76.080 (1971).
36. This conclusion follows from the amendments dispensing with general guardian-
ship requirements for persons over age eighteen. See notes 29-32 and accompanying
text, supra. It is easy to sympathize with parents or relatives of those children who, upon
373
Washington Law Review
sons under age eighteen of sums of $500 or less without requiring
bond or appointment of any guardian,37 and distributions of money or
property of $5000 or less into a bank or trust company account, sub-
ject to withdrawal only on court order. 38 All other cases still require
appointment of a general guardian for estate distributions. 39
III. CONTRACTS
Eighteen year old persons may enter into any legal contractual obli-
gation and are legally bound to the full extent as any other adult
person.40 This includes insurance contracts, 41 though even fifteen year
old minors may enter and are bound by certain life or disability insur-
ance contracts. 42 The law governing the right of a minor to disaffirm
his contracts has not been changed. 43 The principal effect of the 1971
act would seem to be to make the same rules of disaffirmance applica-
ble, but only to contracts entered into by persons below age eighteen.
Significant questions arise, however, with respect to contracts entered
into by persons under twenty-one years of age not yet disaffirmed on
the effective date of the new law.44 Those persons could argue that
they have the right to disaffirm their contracts until age twenty-one, or
a reasonable time thereafter, on the premise that the statutory right of
a person under twenty-one to disaffirm "vested" under the old law and
cannot be interfered with by a subsequent act of the legislature low-
ering the age of majority. 45
reaching eighteen, come into direct possession of assets which they have neither the de-
sire nor training to prudently manage. In these cases, one solution is a revocable inter
vivos trust and appointment of a corporate trustee.
37. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.76.090 (197 1).
38. Id.§ 11.76.095(1971).
39. Id.
40. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.28.015 (1971).
41. Id.§ 48.18.020 (1970).
42. Id. See also WASH. REV. CODE § 26.30.020 (1970), which provides that minors
over sixteen years of age may be bound as adults on certain educational loan obliga-
tions.
43. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.28.030-.050 (1959). For a discussion of disaffirmance
by minors see Comment, Infants' Contracts and Their Enforcement, 35 WASH. L. REV.
465 (1960).
44. The effective date of the law allowing eighteen year olds to contract was May
14, 1970. See note 1, supra.
45. The 1971 act contained no statement of legislative intent with regard to its re-
troactive application. Generally, a statute affecting vested rights or imposing liabilities
not existing at the time of its passage will not be given a retroactive construction.
374
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However, a closer analysis of this issue would lead to a different
result. The statutory right of a minor to disaffirm his contracts within
a reasonable time after reaching majority was not changed by the
1971 act. Lowering the age of majority simply shortened the period
during which the disaffirmance right exists. Thus, the change bears
close analogy to a legislative reduction of a statute of limitations pe-
riod, and the Washington Supreme Court has held such changes to be
remedial in nature, not impairing vested rights.46 If the old statutory
period has not run, persons are allowed the benefit of the entire period
of the new statute commencing from its effective date.47 Applying the
statute of limitations analysis, the result is that in those cases where
the minor was below eighteen on the effective date of the new statute,
he has a reasonable time after reaching eighteen to disaffirm. Where
the person was eighteen or over on the statute's effective date, how-
ever, failure to disaffirm within a reasonable time thereafter fore-
closed the right.
IV. VOTING AND JURY DUTY
The 1971 Washington statute provides that eighteen year old per-
sons may vote in any election if authorized by the Constitution, and
otherwise qualified by law.48 The twenty-sixth amendment to the
Hammack v. Monroe St. Lumber Co., 54 Wn.2d 224, 339 P.2d 684 (1959); Gillis v.
King County, 42 Wn.2d 373, 255 P.2d 546 (1953). It could also be argued that a retro-
active construction would impair the obligations of contracts in violation of the United
States and Washington constitutions. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10 and WASH. CONST. art.
1, § 23.
46. O'Donoghue v. State, 66 Wn.2d 787, 405 P.2d 258 (1965); Earle v. Froedtert
Grain & Malting Co., 197 Wash. 341, 85 P.2d 264 (1938); Hanford v. King County,
112 Wash. 659, 192 P. 1013 (1920).
47. Id.
48. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.28.015 (1971). The qualifications, in addition to age, for
voting in all elections include United States citizenship, state residence for one year, or
sixty days for purposes of voting for the offices of President and Vice President of the
United States, and city, town, ward or precinct residence for thirty days immediately
prior to the election, and the ability to read and speak the English language. WASH.
CONST. art. 6, § 1. However, some of these requirements have been superseded by federal
law and are no longer valid. In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), the United
States Supreme Court upheld section 202 of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of
1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1 (1970), which prohibits states from disqualifying voters
from presidential and vice presidential elections because of failure to meet state resi-
dency requirements. The Court also unanimously upheld section 201 of the Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973aa (1970), which suspends the use of literacy tests for federal, state and local
elections.
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United States Constitution, which prohibits the withholding of voting
rights from eighteen year old citizens on the basis of age, was ratified
by over three-fourths of the state legislatures and was certified on July
7, 197 149 as an effective part of the Constitution. 50 This supersedes
article 6, section 1 of the Washington constitution which would require
qualified electors to be twenty-one years of age. The 1971 act also
changed the voting age to eighteen in certain local district elections,51
including county and intercounty weed districts,5 2 flood control dis-
tricts,5 3 irrigation districts5 4 and water distribution districts. 55
All persons now qualify to serve as jurors in the superior courts of
Washington state if they are electors56 and taxpayers of the state, resi-
dents of the respective county for more than one year preceding their
call to service, in full possession of their faculties and of sound mind,
and able to read and write the English language. 57 The 1971 act
merely removed the previous age requirement of twenty-one years.
Now, the only age qualification for jury service is that effectively im-
posed by the requirement that jurors be electors. 58
49. 36 Fed. Reg. 12725 (197 1). The text of the amendment reads:
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of
age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by
any State on account of age.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate leg-
islation.
50. Prior to the ratification of this amendment, the law was controlled by Oregon v.
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). The Court upheld section 302 of the Voting Rights Act
Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1973bb-1 (1970), insofar as it lowered the minimum
voting age from twenty-one to eighteen for federal elections, but the same provisions
were held invalid as applied to state and local elections.
51. These amendments were to substitute age eighteen where statutes specifically
required age twenty-one for voting. Other statutes did not require specific amendment
since they provide that qualifications for their electors are the same as for general state
or county elections. See, eg., WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.58.520 (1969) (school district
elections).
52. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 17.04.070 and 17.06.050 (1971).
53. Id. § 86.09.364(1971).
54. Id. § 87.03.045 (1971).
55. Id. § 87.60.150 (1971).
56. WASH. REv. CODE § 2.36.060 (1967) requires that jurors be selected from the
county files of registered voters. Thus, for purposes ofjury duty, an "elector" is a "regis-
tered voter" rather than any elector qualified under WASH. CONST. art. 6. § 1.
57. WASh. REv. CODE § 2.36.070 (1971).
58. The first juries to regularly seat eighteen year olds in Washington will not be
impaneled until after August 1, 1972. WASH. REV. CODE § 2.36.060 (1967) requires all
voter registrars to certify and file a list of all qualified voters before the first day of June
of each year for jury duty selection. In July, the superior court judges of each county
select by lot from these lists a sufficient number of qualified persons to serve as jurors
until the first day of August of the next calendar year. Thus, since no eighteen year olds
376
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V. LAWSUITS, PROCESS, STATUTES OF LIMITATION
Persons eighteen years old may sue and be sued on any action to
the same extent as any other adult person in any of the courts of this
state, without the necessity for a guardian ad litem.59 An added effect
of this statute is to enable Washington domiciliaries eighteen years of
age to sue and be sued in any federal court in the United States in
their individual capacities. 60 In lawsuits which were commenced prior
to the effective date of the guardianship amendments, 61 the power of a
guardian ad litem terminated on that date if his ward was then
eighteen years of age or older.62 In those cases where the ward was not
eighteen on the statute's effective date, the guardian ad litem's power
expires when the ward reaches eighteen years of age.6 3
The 1971 act provides that civil actions in superior court may be
commenced by service of summons by any person eighteen years of
age or over, 64 who is not the plaintiff, and who is competent to be a
witness in the action.6 5 Similar provisions were enacted for justice
could appear on the voter registration files before July of 1971, the first selection to in-
clude their names will be in July of 1972 for the jury year of August 1, 1972 to July 31,
1973. However, a few eighteen year old jurors may serve before August of 1972 if coun-
ties find it necessary to select additional jurors to meet unusual demands.
59. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.28.015 (1971). Infants who are parties to actions must
appear by guardian. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.08.050 (1959).
60. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b). This rule provides that in federal courts the capacity of a
person to sue or be sued in his individual capacity is determined by the law of his domi-
cile. See also 3A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 17.16, at 651-54 (2d ed. 1964). Federal
Rule 17(c) does not make the appointment of a guardian ad litem for a minor manda-
tory in federal courts, if the court feels that the infant's interests are otherwise ade-
quately represented and protected. However, the rule does not permit trial judges to
ignore the protection of infants. Roberts v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 256 F.2d 35 (5th Cir.
1958).
61. See note 29, supra.
62. See note 32 and accompanying text, supra.
63. Id. See also In re Brown, 6 Wn.2d 215, 230, 101 P.2d 1003 (1940); Meeker v.
Mettler, 50 Wash. 473, 97 P. 507 (1908). The courts of other states have held that a
guardian ad litem has no power once his ward reaches the age of majority. See, e.g.,
Maryland Cas. Co. v. Owens, 261 Ala. 446, 74 So. 2d 608 (1954). Also, upon reaching
majority the ward may take over and manage his lawsuit either as plaintiff or defendant.
Drescher v. Morgan, 251 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Cozine v. Bonnick, 245
S.W.2d 935 (Ky. 1952); Obennoskey v. Obennoskey, 215 Ark. 358, 220 S.W.2d 610
(1949); Simmons v. Rogers, 247 N.C. 340, 100 S.E.2d 849 (1957); O'Neill v. Cole, 194
Va. 50, 72 S.E.2d 382 (1952).
64. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.28.070 (1971). This presumably supersedes Washington
Civil Rules 4(c) for superior court and justice court which provide that a person must be
twenty-one to serve a summons.
65. Generally, every person of sound mind, who is capable of receiving just impres-
sions of facts, is a competent witness in any action or proceeding, regardless of age. See
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 5.60.020, .050 (1959). See also Stafford, The Child as a Witness, 37
WASH. L. REv. 303 (1962).
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courts. 66 Other process may also be served now by eighteen year olds. 67
On the receiving end, the law still provides that personal service
may be obtained by serving personally minors over fourteen years of
age. 68
The concomitant to lowering the age of capacity for suing and
being sued is to lower the age of personal disability for purposes of the
statutes of limitation. Statutes of limitation for the commencement of
actions now begin to run against persons when they reach the age of
eighteeen years, unless they are otherwise disabled. 69 The 1971 act
also changed the age reference to eighteen for limitation of actions
regarding the registration of land titles,70 and provided that unmarried
females over eighteen years of age may bring a civil action for dam-
ages resulting from their seduction. 71
VI. DECISIONS WITH REGARD TO THE BODY
Eighteen year old persons may make decisions in regard to their
own bodies, and the bodies of their lawful issue, natural born or
adopted, to the full extent allowed to any other adult persons, in-
cluding but not limited to consent to surgical operations.72 The effect
of this statute is to enable eighteen year olds to give valid consent to
medical treatment of all kinds, 73 but it should in no way affect the
requirement that a valid consent be "informed" when determining
66. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 12.04.050, .080 (1971).
67. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.33.130 (1971) (writ of garnishment); §§ 8.04.020,
.20.020 (1971) (notice of eminent domain proceedings by the state and by corpora-
tions); § 79.01.704 (1971) (subpoenas for hearings pertaining to state lands);§§ 85.05.110, .06.110 (1971) (summons to diking and drainage district hearings
in superior court).
68. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.28.080 (1967).
69. WASH. RE'. CODE § 4.16.190 (1971). The effect of this change on the law of ad-
verse possession of real property is discussed in notes 99 and 100 and accompanying
text, infra.
70. WASH. REX'. CODE § 65.12.710 (1971).
71. Id. § 4.24.030 (1971).
72. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.28.015 (1971).
73. This simply removes the prior disability of persons between the ages of eighteen
and twenty-one to make valid consent to treatment. The rule stated in In re Hudson, 13
Wn.2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942), that consent for treatment of an infant must first be
obtained from his parent or guardian, would now seem to apply to treatment of persons
under eighteen years of age. See also Grannum v. Berard, 70 Wn.2d 304, 422 P.2d 812
(1967) which states the Hudson rule regarding infant consent and proceeds to discuss the
mental capacity necessary to make a valid consent.
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such issues as a physician's tort liability.7 4 Nor should the act affect
decisions holding that persons under the age of majority may be con-
sidered emancipated for purposes of giving valid consent, to medical
treatment.75
Prior law authorizes eighteen year old unmarried women to alone
consent to an abortion.76 Persons eighteen years of age may donate
blood without parental consent,77 and make gifts of all or portions of
their bodies to take effect upon death as provided in the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act.78 Although they are not directly within the scope
of this paper, two recent Washington statutes should be mentioned
which make exception to the general requirement that a person be of
majority age to make a valid consent. Minors fourteen years of age or
older may give valid consent for diagnosis and treatment of venereal
disease,79 and for approved public or private care, treatment, rehabili-
tation or counseling in regard to alcohol or drug abuse problems.80
VII. QUALIFICATIONS FOR PUBLIC OFFICE
Since persons eighteen years of age may now be qualified electors, 8 '
they may qualify for the highest public offices in this state.8 2 They
74. See Hunter v. Brown, 4 Wn. App. 899, 484 P.2d 1162 (1971).
75. See Smith v. Seibly, 72 Wn.2d 16, 431 P.2d 719 (1967). In Smith the minor was
married, the head of his own family, had completed high school, and earned the living
and maintained his own home.
76. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.02.070 (1970). This statute further provides that if married
and residing with her husband, or if unmarried and under the age of eighteen years, a
female must obtain the consent of her husband or parents, respectively, prior to an abor-
tion. Thus, a married female under eighteen who is not residing with her husband may
alone consent to an abortion, and if husband and wife reside together and both consent
to the abortion, it is authorized even though both may be under eighteen years of age.
See OP. WASH. ATr'y GEN. 1971, No. 15. See also Note, 11 SANTA CLARA LAWYER
469 (1971).
77. WASH. REV. CODE § 70.01.020 (1969).
78. Id. §§ 68.08.500-.610 (1969).
79. Id. § 70.24.110 (1969). The statute provides that the parents or guardian are not
liable for payment for any of this care.
80. WASH. REV. CODE § 69.54.060 (1971). The parents or guardian are liable for
payment for this care only if they join in the consent.
81. See notes 48-50 and accompanying text, supra.
82. WASH. CONST. art. 3, § 25 provides in part that "no person, except a citizen of
the United States and a qualified elector of this state, shall be eligible to hold any state
office .... Insofar as this article requires state officers to be qualified electors, it has
been held to apply only to those elected state officers named in article 3, section 1 of the
Washington constitution (governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, treasurer,
auditor, attorney general, superintendent of schools, public land commissioner) and not
to appointive positions. State ex rel. Tattersall v. Yelle, 52 Wn.2d 856, 329 P.2d 841
(1958).
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may be elected to the state legislature,83 and may hold elective public
office in counties, districts, precincts, school districts, municipal cor-
porations and all other districts or political subdivisions within the
state. 84 All of these offices require the applicant to be a United States
citizen, and in addition, either a qualified elector 85 or a qualified
voter.86
The 1971 act specifically changed the age qualifications to eighteen
years for certain state offices. 87 However, these and many other local
offices carry additional statutory qualifications such as length of resi-
dence, minimum years of experience, minimum education, or land
ownership in the district, which effectively puts them out of reach for
eighteen year olds. Moreover, because some cities and other political
subdivisions have requirements for their offices in addition to those
imposed by the state constitution and statutes,88 their laws must be
consulted before concluding that particular local offices or positions
83. WAsH. (ONST. art. 2, § 7 requires state legislators to be United States citizens
and "qualified voters." This requires candidates to be registered voters in the district
which they choose to represent. Defilipis v. Russell, 52 Wn.2d 745, 328 P.2d 904 (1958).
84. WAsH. REV. CODE § 42.09.020 (1959) provides:
That no person shall be competent to qualify for or hold any elective public office
within the state of Washington, or any county, district, precinct, school district,
municipal corporation or other district or political subdivision, unless he be a cit-
izen of the United States and state of Washington and an elector of such county.
district, precinct, school district, municipality or other district or political subdivi-
sion.
In Tennent v. Stacy, 48 Wn. 2d 104, 291 P.2d 647 (1955), it was held that persons
who meet the qualifications in WASH. CONST. art. 6. § 1 are "electors" for purposes of
WASH. REV. CODE § 42.04.020 (1959) and they need not be registered voters. Thus.
eighteen year old Washington citizens who are "electors" in the respective political
subdivision are eligible to hold any elective offices therein unless they fail to meet
additional requirements for the particular offices imposed by the state constitution.
or state or local statutes.
85. A "qualified elector" is one who meets the requirements of WASH. CONST. art.
6, § 1. See notes 48 and 49, supra. However, the person need not be a registered voter.
Tennent v. Stacy, 48 Wn.2d 104, 291 P.2d 647 (1955). Construction of a particular
statute may compel a conclusion that by "qualified elector" the legislature meant "quali-
fied registered elector." State ex rel. Hubbard v. Lindsay, 52 Wn.2d 397, 326 P.2d 47
(1958).
86. See note 83, supra. It would seem that where a local statute requires a candidate
for a particular office to be a "qualified voter" this would require him to be a registered
voter.
87. WASH. REV. CODE § 38.12.060 (1971) (officers of the state militia); Id. §
87.03.045 (1971) (irrigation district directors); Id. § 15.68.140 (197 1) (members of the
state farm advisory board); Id. §§ 17.04.070, .06.050 (1971) (county and intercounty
weed district boards); Id. § 18.83.030 (1971) (state examining board of psychology):
Id. § 88.16.010 (1971) (state board of pilotage commissioners).
88. These added requirements are upheld where not in conflict with the state legisla-
tion. State ex. rel. Isham v. Spokane, 2 Wn.2d 392, 98 P.2d 306 (1940).
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are open to particular eighteen year old persons. In general, however,
the controls of state government are now accessible to eighteen year
old citizens. 89
VIII. STATE BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSES
Eighteen year old persons may now form corporations and carry on
business in Washington. 90 They may also be licensed as weighmasters,
accountants, architects, chiropodists, debt adjusters, dental hygienists,
dispensing opticians, funeral directors and embalmers, pharmacists,
practical nurses, veterinarians, insurance agents and brokers, insur-
ance adjusters, and hoistmen in a coal mine.91 However, most of these
jobs and professions have minimum statutory requirements with re-
spect to education or experience which in effect exclude most eighteen
year olds. Thus, about the only effect of lowering the age require-
ments in this area is uniformity in the law.
IX. MISCELLANEOUS AMENDMENTS
The Uniform Gifts to Minors Act was amended by the 1971 stat-
ute, which redefines minors as persons under eighteen and provides
that to the extent the custodial property has not been expended, the
custodian must deliver or pay it over to the minor when he reaches
eighteen, or if he dies before attaining that age, then to his estate.92
The Gifts of Realty to Minors Act was similarly amended, and it now
requires a conveyance out to the donee when he reaches eighteen
years of age.93 Whether or not these amendments operate on gifts
89. Qualifications for federal offices are still controlled by the United States Consti-
tution and statutes.
90. WASH. REv. CODE § 23A.12.010 (1971).
91. Id. § 15.80.460 (1971) (weighmasters); § 18.04.120 (1971) (accountants); §
18.08.140 (1971) (architects); § 18.22.040 (1971) (chiropodists); § 18.28.060 (1971)
(debt adjusters); § 18.29.020 (1971) (dental hygienists); § 18.34.070 (1971) (dispensing
opticians); § 18.39.030 (1971) (funeral directors); § 18.39.040 (1971) (embalmers); §
18.64.080 (1971) (pharmacists); § 18.78.060 (1971) (practical nurses); § 18.92.070
(1971) (veterinarians); § 48.17.150 (1971) (insurance agents and brokers); § 48.17.380
(1971) (insurance adjusters); § 78.40.293 (1971) (coal mine hoistmen).
92. Id. §§ 21.24.010,.040 (1971).
93. Id. §§ 21.25.010, .040 (1971).
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made prior to the effective date of the act is uncertain.94  In the real
property area, for purposes of filing a declaration of homestead, per-
sons can no longer meet the requirement of a "head of the family" by
furnishing residence, care and maintenance to relatives over age
eighteen who are able to support themselves. 95 This also applies to the
definition of a "householder" for purposes of securing personal ex-
emptions from execution and attachment. 96 Persons eighteen years of
age and over are now eligible to occupy county homesite lands 97 and
to enter lands for purposes of reclamation, cultivation and settlement
pursuant to the Carey Act.98 However, the general ten-year statute of
limitations for adverse possession,9 9 as well as the seven-year statutes'00
for possessors under color-of-title and of vacant land, now run against
persons eighteen years of age in favor of the occupant of their land.
The 1971 act also amended certain tax statutes. Third class cities
and towns may now tax male inhabitants over eighteen years of age. t0a
The Washington gift tax statute was amended by reducing to
eighteen years the donee's age for purposes of determining if, under
the other statutory conditions, a gift is of a future interest, thus dis-
94. Delivery to a custodian by the donor, while vesting indefeasible legal title im-
mediately in the minor, may also create a contractual relationship between the donor
and the custodian. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 21.24.030, .25.030 (1967). If so, the contract
might be construed to impose upon the custodian of prior gifts the duty to retain the
property until the donee reaches twenty-one, as required by the statute prior to amend-
ment. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 21.24.040, .25.040 (1967). To apply the 1971 amendments
to prior gifts, thus requiring a transfer to the donee at age eighteen, arguably would
unconstitutionally impair the custodian's contractual obligation. U.S. CONST. art. 1, §
10; WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 23.
On the other hand, any resulting contract might reasonably be held to comprise only
those statutory provisions essential to the donor's purpose in making the gift. Donors
use the Gifts to Minors Acts principally as a device to obtain federal and state gift tax
exclusions without the time and expense burdens of an ordinary trust. See note 102 and
accompanying text, infra. It could thus be argued that the custodian of prior gifts is free
to convey the property to the donee when he reaches age eighteen.
95. WASH. REV. CODE § 6.12.290 (1971).
96. Id. § 6.16.010 (1971).
97. Id. § 36.59.310 (1971).
98. Id. § 79.48.130 (1971). This statute allows persons to enter up to 160 acres of
the arid lands donated to the state by the federal government.
99. See text accompanying note 69, supra.
100. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.28.090 (1971). The third seven-year statute for possessors
under connected-title was held to run equally against minors and adults. See Id. §
7.28.050 (1959); Schlarb v. Castaing, 50 Wash. 331, 97 P. 289 (1908).
101. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 35.24.370, .27.500 (1971).
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qualifying it from the annual $3,000 exclusion.10 2 The state property
tax exemption was also modified slightly.103
The Motor Vehicle Code was amended to provide that persons
eighteen years of age or older are now eligible to drive any motor ve-
hicle transporting persons for compensation, including any bus trans-
porting school children.' 04 An "adult driver's license" will be issued to
persons eighteen years of age or older automatically and without a,
fee.105 However, the Department of Motor Vehicles is still authorized
to furnish to parents the department records regarding traffic charges
against their unemancipated children under twenty-one years of age.' 0 6
State hospitals may now admit eighteen year old persons, who do
not have a guardian of their person, as voluntary mental patients for
observation, care and treatment in state hospitals. 107 Children under
eighteen may also be admitted upon application of their parents, but
they may not be involuntarily detained after reaching age eighteen. 108
In the case of involuntary mental patients, the courts are now author-
ized to order financially able parents to pay court costs and hospitali-
zation charges only for children under eighteen years of age.10 9 The
law now provides that no mentally ill person under sixteen years of
age may be regularly confined in adult wards, and no sixteen or seven-
teen year old patients may be so confined if to do so would impede
their recovery or treatment."10 Only those mental patients under age
eighteen now qualify for special wards or attendants."'
Certain criminal statutes were also amended. Pawnbrokers may
now receive property from persons over eighteen years of age without
criminal liability, 12 and merchants may sell cigars, cigarettes or to-
102. WASH. REV. CODE § 83.56.050 (1971). In determining the exclusion for federal
gift tax purposes, the relevant age is still twenty-one years. See INT. REV. CODE of
1954, § 2503(c).
103. WASH. REV. CODE § 84.36.030 (1971). The exemption was partly qualified to
extend to property owned by nonprofit organizations engaged in character building in
children under eighteen years of age, where the age had been twenty-one years pre-
viously.
104. Id. § 46.20.045 (1971).
105. Id. § 46.20.104 (1971).
106. Id. § 46.20.293 (1971).
107. Id. § 72.23.070 (1971).
108. Id. § 72.23.090 (1971).
109. Id. §i 71.02.230, .411 (1971).
110. Id. § 72.23.200 (1971).
111. Id. § 72.23.210 (1971).
112. Id.§ 19.60.063 (1971).
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bacco to eighteen year olds. 113 However, it is still a crime to sell or
give intoxicating liquor to any person under twenty-one years of age.'14
X. UNAMENDED STATUTES WHERE EIGHTEEN IS NOT
THE LEGAL AGE
The only areas of the Washington law unamended by the 1971
statute are those sections which still specifically provide that a person
must be of an age other than eighteen years for their purposes. Title
66, dealing with alcoholic beverage control, is the most significant
area of the Code which still specifies that twenty-one years is the legal
age.11 5 Unless supplied by a parent for beverage or medicinal pur-
poses, or administered by a physician or dentist, it is unlawful for per-
sons under twenty-one years of age to acquire, possess, or consume
liquor,1 16 and except for those purposes it is also a crime to supply
liquor to persons under twenty-one years old. 117
113. Id. § 26.28.080 (1971).
114. Id. The age of majority is still twenty-one with respect to the purchase and con-
sumption of alcoholic beverages. See WASH. REv. CODE ch. 66.
115. Relatively few other Code sections still attach legal significance to age
twenty-one. See WASH. REV. CODE §§ 13.04.095, .250 (1967) (providing respectively for
commitment of a juvenile deliquent until age twenty-one and destruction of a juvenile
delinquent's files when he reaches age twenty-one); § 28A.58.190 (1969) (providing
that state common schools are open to persons between the ages bf six and twenty-one
years); § 43.5 1.530 (1965) (making twenty-one the maximum age for members of the
state parks and recreation youth corps): § 46.20.293 (1971) (allowing the Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles to furnish parents with the traffic records of their unemanci-
pated children under age twenty-one); §§ 51.08.030. .32.005 (1969) (defining "child"
to include full time students under age twenty-one for purposes of industrial insurance
compensation); § 72.40.040 (1969) (providing that persons between ages six and
twenty-one shall be admitted free to state schools for the blind and deaf, and that per-
sons over age twenty-one may be retained at the institution in the discretion of the
superintendent); § 74.20A.020 (1971) (defining "dependent children" to include per-
sons under age twenty-one for purposes of enforcement of support obligations by the
department of public assistance); however, this statute was passed in the 1971 first
extraordinary session just prior to the act lowering the age of majority from twenty-one
to eighteen. Since a stated purpose of the public assistance statute was to meet the needs
of minor children, the subsequent act reducing majority to age eighteen would seem to
have impliedly repealed the age twenty-one reference in the statute.
116. WASH. REV. CODE § 66.44.270 (1955). As one defense to a prosecution under
this statute, it could be argued that in light of the broad sweep of the 1971 legislation
giving eighteen year olds all other rights of citizenship in Washington, and imposing on
them the corresponding duties, to require that they be twenty-one years of age to pur-
chase and consume alcohol is an unreasonable classification and defective under the
equal protection guarantee of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion.
117. Id. WASH. REV. CODE § 66.04.010(16) (1969) includes in the definition of"liq-
uor" all alcohol, spirits, wine, beer and malt liquor.
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CONCLUSION
The 1971 statute makes eighteen year old persons adults for vir-
tually all purposes except purchase and consumption of alcoholic bev-
erages. Hopefully, the provisions of this law, coupled with the newly
acquired constitutional right of eighteen year olds to vote in federal,
state and local elections, will encourage civic responsibility and facili-
tate greater public involvement of young people through participation
in the governmental system.
The next Washington legislative session will see bills introduced to
lower to eighteen the age for purchase and consumption of alcoholic
beverages. Other areas of law will also come under legislative scrutiny
in the years ahead. By recognizing that persons mature earlier in this
modern age, the legislature has invited a reexamination of certain stat-
utes such as that which sets the age when criminal capacity should be
presumed, 118 and that which specifies the age of consent for purposes
of statutory rape. 1 9 A problem also exists in determining at what age
childrens' wishes should be considered when awarding custody in di-
vorce actions, 20 and perhaps the legislature could reduce the confu-
sion with a presumptive age of maturity in this regard. 121 These and
similar areas where legal distinctions are based on age now deserve
reflection.
118. WASH. R-Ev. CODE § 9.01.111 (1959). Cf. Graving v. Dorn, 63 Wn.2d 236, 386
P.2d 621 (1963), in which the court refused to adopt a rebuttable presumption that in-
fants six to fourteen years of age are incapable of contributory negligence.
119. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.79.020 (1959).
120. See Nelson v. Nelson, 43 Wn.2d 278, 260 P.2d 886 (1953). This case decided
that a child's wishes may be considered on the issue of custody if the child is sufficiently
mature to have intelligent views on the subject. Such a test leaves a great deal of discre-
tion to the individual judge and establishes no objective standard.
121. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.32.030 (1959), which provides that persons fourteen
years of age or older must consent in writing to their own adoption.
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